On the Coding of Sentential Modality by Zaefferer, Dietmar & Bechert, Johannes
Empirical Approaches 





Mouton de Gruyter 
Berlin · New York 






Mouton de Gruyter 
Berlin · New York 1990 
Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) 
is a Divis ion of Walter de Gruyter & Co. , Berlin. 
© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the A N S I to ensure permanence 
and durability. 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 
Toward a typology of European languages / edited by Johannes 
Bechert, Giuliano Bernini, Claude Buridant. 
p. cm. — (Empirical approaches to language typology ; 8) 
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. 
ISBN 0-89925-588-4 (alk. paper) 
1. Europe —Languages. 2. Typology (Linguistics) I. Bechert, 
Johannes, 1931— . II. Bernini, Guil iano. III. Buridant, 
Claude. IV. Series. 
P380.T68 1990 
415-dc20 90-13307 
Deutsche Bibliothek Cataloging in Publication Data 
Toward a typology of European languages / ed. by Johannes 
Bechert . . . — Berlin ; New York : Mouton de Gruyter, 1990 
(Empirical approaches to language typology ; 8) 
ISBN 3-11-012108-5 
N E : Bechert, Johannes [Hrsg.]; G T 
© Copyright 1990 by Walter de Gruyter & Co. , D-1000 Berlin 30. 
A l l rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. N o part of this book 
may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, 
including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without 
permission in writing from the publisher. 
Typesetting: Arthur Coll ignon G m b H , Berlin. — Printing: Druckerei Gerike G m b H , Berlin. — 
Binding: Dieter Mikola i , Berlin. Printed in Germany. 
Contents 
Foreword by Bernard Pottier vii 
Introduction ix 
/. General problems 1 
Standard Average European as an exotic language 
Osten Dahl . . ' 3 
Tvpological contrasts between pidgin and creole languages in relation 
to their European language superstrates 
Suzanne Romaine 9 
Area influence versus typological drift in Western Europe: the case of 
negation 
Paolo Ramat and Giuliano Bernini 25 
2. Deixis 47 
Deixis — a pragmatic universal? 
Barbara Kryk 49 
Possessive adnominal modifiers 
Gianguido Manzelli 63 
3. Morphology 113 
The structure of the noun in European languages 
Johannes Bechert 115 
L'infinitif dans les langues romanes et les langues germaniques: essai 
d'approche typologique 
Claude Buridant 141 
The infinitive in south-east European languages 
Emanuele Banfi 165 
Conjugation of the verb in modern Celtic and Basque: from inflection 
to periphrasis 
Malachv Mckenna 185 
vi Contents 
4. Tense, aspect and modality 193 
Types of tense and aspect systems 
Wolfgang Raible 195 
On the coding of sentential modality 
Dietmar Zaefferer 215 
5. Act amy/voice 239 
Caractérist iques actancielles de l '"européen moyen type" 
Gilbert Lazard 241 
Processes and actions: internal agentless impersonals in some European 
languages 
Juan Carlos Moreno 255 
Questions of the investigation of the complements of adjectives in 
European languages 
Laszló Dezsö 273 
6. Complementation and subordination 305 
The evolution of certain patterns in subordination in Romance and 
English 
Martin Harris 307 
Usages normatifs et non normatifs dans les relatives en français, en 
espagnol et en portugais 
Claire Blanche-Benveniste 317 
Adverbial participles, gerunds and absolute constructions in the lan­
guages of Europe 
Ekkehard König and Johan van der Auwera 337 
Index of names 357 
Index of languages 365 
Index of subjects 373 
214 Wo!fow« Raible 
S f a h 1 s c h m i d t, A η d r c a 
1982 Pas \ 'erbalsystem des Uopi, Eine semantische Strukturanalyse der Uopi-drammatik 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von B. L. W'horfs Thesen %ur Zeitauffa s sung der 11 ο pi 
Indianer. Dissertation Münster . (Arbeitsberichte aus dem Seminar für Allgemeine 
und Indogermanische Sprachwissenschaft, Heft 7, Oktober 1983.) K ie l . 
Yendler, Zeno 
1957 "Verbs and Times", The Philosophical Review 46: 143—160. 
1967 Linguistics in Philosophy. Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press. 
W il met, Marc 
1980 "Aspect grammatical, aspect sémant ique , aspect lexical: un prob lème de limites", 
in: Jean David — Robert Martin (eds.), La notion d'aspect. Metz/Paris: Klincksieck, 
5 1 - 6 8 . 
On the coding of sentential modality 
Dietmar Zaefferer 
Introduction 
The categories of sentence mood and sentential modality are not very well 
investigated topics in current linguistic typology. What I am going to argue 
for in this paper is that these phenomena should receive more attention, since 
both a) typology itself and the related areas of general linguistics, and b) 
more philosophically oriented foundational attempts at reducing the meaning 
of linguistic expressions to the conventional use they are put to, would benefit 
a lot from progress in this area. I will illustrate this by outlining the 
consequences that might be derived from some of the scattered cross-linguistic 
data on the coding of sentential modality that have been accumulated so far 
(cf. Sadock — Zwicky 1985, or Palmer 1986) for the theory of illocution types 
argued for e.g. in Searle —Vanderveken (1985). 
1. What is sentential modality, what is sentence mood? 
In order to answer these questions we first have to answer the question: 
What is a sentence? And in order to answer this question, 1 claim, we have 
to go back one further step and answer the question: What is a proposition? 
Most semanticists agree that a proposition is something that can be true or 
false, and 1 would like to specify without further discussion that it is the 
holding of a given state of affairs, of a way things can be, in a given domain 
(this is what Barwise and Ktchemendy 1987 call the Austinian view, after 
Austin 1961). 
A proposition-level expression then is an expression that, under appropriate 
circumstances of use, is about a proposition, and a sentence is a proposition-
level expression the use of which in a given discourse situation conventionally 
determines (a) the proposition it is about and (b) the role of this proposition 
in the discourse in which it occurs. 
We will call the maximal proposition the use of a sentence is about1 its 
propositional content and the role of this proposition in the discourse, insofar 
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as it is primarily coded with linguistic means, its (sentential) modality or 
sentence mode. That part of the sentential modality that is structurally 
determined will be called sentence mood. 2 It follows that sentence mood is 
part of the structural meaning of a sentence. It follows furthermore, since 
the inventories of structural meaning vary from language to language, that 
sentential modality is much less language-dependent than sentence mood; for 
instance the promissive sentential modality is expressible in all natural lan­
guages, but it constitutes a sentence mood, i . c. is coded in the structure of 
sentences only in Korean 3 (and possibly in Gilyak), as far as 1 know. 
This is a rather generous conception of sentential modality, one that e.g. 
Palmer would deem too wide (1986: 15), but he seems to be a little confused 
about what is propositional and what not. For instance, standard negation is 
certainly not a non-propositional element, since it takes you from one prop­
osition to another one. Also I would not subscribe to Sadock and Zwicky's 
claim that attitude marking modal particles should be excluded from defining 
the notion of sentence type and hence of sentence mood (Sadock — Zwicky 
1985: 161), but 1 agree that they are secondary insofar as they only modify 
the primary sentence mood determined by other means. 
The main reason 1 want to have such a fine-grained notion of sentence 
mood, besides simplicity (one doesn't have to care about how exactly to draw 
the line between mood markers and attitude markers), is that the way modal 
particles modify the primary sentence mood is not always specification, 
creating a special case of the same sentence mood, but sometimes conversion, 
creating some other sentence mood. 4 A case in question is the 1 English -ever, 
which converts subordinate constituent interrogatives like j I don t know j what 
yon do into "unconditionals" like Whatever you do, j please do it carefully! (cf. 
Zaeffercr 1990). But in the following I will be mostly concerned with the 
most basic and elementary sentence moods. 
2. A proposal of basing all illocutionary forces on five 
primitive ones: Searle and Vanderveken's classification 
In his joint book with Daniel Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic 
(Searle —Vanderveken 1985), John Searle gives an a priori justification of his 
earlier classification of illocutionary acts into five main categories (Searle 
1975). "In spite of frequent philosophical protestations to the contrary," he 
says, "there is a rather limited number of things one can do with language" 
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(Searle —Vanderveken 1985: 51). Why should that be so? Because the illo-
cutionarv force of an illocution always relates its proposition to a world of 
utterance and there is only a limited number of ways a proposition can be 
related to a world of utterance. Borrowing from Austin and Anscombc, 
Searle calls these ways directions of fit, and he says that there are four and 
only four of them in language: word-to-world, world-to-word, double direc­
tion, and empty direction. 
If one associates with each direction of fit one primitive illocutionary force 
except for the world-to-word one, where two forces are associated, one that 
is addressee-oriented and one that is speaker-oriented, then one comes up 
with Searle's five primitive illocutionary forces: 1. The assertive force with 
word-to-world direction of fit; 2. the commissive force with world-to-word 
direction of fit and speaker responsibility; 3. the directive force with the same 
direction of fit and addressee responsibility; 4. the declarative force with 
double direction of fit; and 5. the expressive force with empty direction of 
fit. 
1 examples are assertions and statements for the assertive force, promises 
and vows for the commissive force, orders and requests for the directive 
force, explicit performatives and other declarations for the declarative force, 
and finally congratulations and apologies for the expressive force. 
Searle and Vanderveken do not fail to draw the important distinction 
between naming and expressing an illocutionary force: 5 Whereas the former 
is exclusively done with verbs and nouns, i.e. lexical means, the latter is done 
mainly with structural means, and the two functions overlap only in the case 
of explicit performatives, where the force is expressed by mixed lexical-
structural means, but although Searle and Vanderveken have a lot to say 
about the naming of illocutionary forces (in chapter 9, they analyse over a 
hundred of English illocutionary verbs), they are not very explicit about the 
ways the five primitive illocutionary forces arc expressed. 
"In English", they say, "the primitive assertive illocutionary force is . . . 
expressed by the indicative mood" (1985: 60). This is surely not correct, if 
one takes indicative to be the verbal mood, since there are many sentences 
with the main verb in the indicative mood, that do not have an assertive 
illocutionary force, like interrogative, protasis, or relative clauses, but we can 
assume that by indicative mood, the declarative sentence mood is meant, 
which seems to be sometimes the usage in philosophy of language. 
The primitive commissive illocutionary force, they go on to say, is indirectly 
expressed by the modal auxiliary will, since there is no illocutionary force 
indicating device for this force in English (1985: 60). This is only correct if 
one interprets "illocutionary force indicating device" as meaning only struc-
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turai and excluding lexical devices, since their own example / hereby commit 
myself to fighting it out on this line even if it takes all summer shows that the 
explicit performative formula is exactly such a device, albeit not a purely 
structural one. 
About the third primitive illocutionary force, the directive one, Searle and 
Vanderveken say that in English it is most naturally expressed with the 
imperative mood (1985: 61), which is probably correct. 
The fourth primitive illocutionary force, the declarative one, is according 
to Searle and Vanderveken most naturally expressed with performative sen­
tences (1985: 61), and again, 1 have no objection. 
Finally, they say that in English there is no special syntactic device for 
expressing the primitive expressive illocutionary force as distinct from ex­
pressing particular, non-primitive expressive illocutionary forces (1985: 62). 
This sounds as if they assume that there are special syntactic devices for 
expressing at least one of the special forces that arc named by verbs like 
apologise, thank, condole, congratulate, complain, lament, protest, deplore, boast, 
compliment, praise, welcome, and greet (listed by Searle and Vanderveken, 1985: 
211), but 1 cannot think of any construction type that would do this. 
On the other hand, there is a syntactic device in English, a construction 
(or better a family of constructions) that is related to, but distinct from the 
interrogative constructions, and that is used for expressing an illocutionary 
force which is most naturally called expressive, a construction not mentioned 
bv Searle and Vanderveken at all, namely the exclamatory construction (or 
constructions), illustrated by sentences like Boy, am I ever hot today! or What 
a lovely T-shirt you are wearing! And exclamatory constructions are nothing 
that would occur only in F^nglish or a few languages, but they are a reasonably 
common phenomenon in the languages of the world (cf. Sadock — Zwicky 
1985: 162; for the relation with interrogatives Elliott 1971: 102—104, Elliott 
1974: 244-245). 
Moreover, and even more prominently, there is a sentential modality that 
is probably a sentence mood in all languages in the world, which also does 
not figure among Searle and Vanderveken's primitive illocutionary forces, 
and that is the erotctic mode w7ith its corresponding interrogative moods. O f 
course, they do talk about questions, but only as a special case of directives, 
and they do not even discuss the possibility of having them as a primitive 
illocutionary force. 
So if one looks at the four most prominent sentence moods, at least in 
English, on the one hand, and at Searle and Vanderveken's five primitive 
illocution types, on the other, a certain mismatch can be seen: 
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Major sentence moods of English Primitive illocution types 









Now there is no need to expect a perfect match here, but something has 
to be explained at least, and maybe even something has to be changed, if one 
takes into account that natural languages tend to code with structural, i . e. 
grammatical, means only the most central, general, and important notions 
and distinctions such as discourse participant role, number, gender, tense, 
definiteness, etc. It seems very plausible indeed that the hierarchy of coding 
(1) reflects some hierarchy of basicness in the notional structure of natural 
languages. 
(1) grammatical (unmarked) < grammatical (marked) < lexical (root) < 
lexical (stem) < lexical (compound) < phrasal 
For instance in languages with both "pure" and adpositional case marking, 
it is the more basic, central and abstract grammatical roles that become 
marked with "pure" cases and the less basic, more peripheral and more 
concrete ones that receive adpositional marking. On the other hand, if there 
are no other means of coding than phrasal ones, the chances arc that what is 
coded is not a very central notion, category or distinction. There is of course 
a tendency to lexicali/.e such notions once their relevance (and frequency of 
usage) increases, very often with the help of acronyms and other abbrevia­
tions, compare c. g. computer assisted design and CAD. 
One caveat should be added which comes up immediately if one thinks 
about the origins of these ways of coding. Since many grammatical means 
became what they are through a process of grammaticalixation and these 
processes tend to take more time than processes of lcxicalization, and since 
the lifespan of grammatical means tends to be longer than that of lexical 
items, it may well be that the notions coded by grammatical means are not 
as central today as they were when they started to become expressible by 
grammatical items. 
If this is correct, and if declarative, interrogative, imperative, exclamatory 
and optative arc indeed the most widespread (in decreasing order) sentence 
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moods in natural languages, then it seems that the modes or forces of 
assertion, question, directive, exclamation and expression of wish are in some 
sense most basic for classifying the different roles the expression of a prop­
osition may play in human linguistic usage. 
The question arises whether this can be reconciled with the Searle — 
Vanderveken claim that assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, and 
declarative are the most basic roles played by propositions in natural language, 
and if so, what such a reconciliation would look like, if not, how the speech 
act theoretical assumptions about the basic categories should be revised. 
3. Ways of coding sentential modality: A survey of some 
European languages (with some non-European 
background) 
3.1. An inventory of structural means used for the coding of 
sentential modality 
If one thinks about structural indicators for sentential modality, in other 
words for sentence mood, from a European perspective, probably the follow­
ing three or four will come up first: interrogative words, which seem to mark 
constituent questions everywhere, verbal mood (think of the imperative mood 
in Greek, Latin, German), word order (or more precisely constituent order), 
whose role as a sentence mood indicator is especially conspicuous in German 
with its three basic sentence types, and intonation, which plays some role 
everywhere, but which, e. g. in spoken Russian, is usually the indicator of 
polarity questions. 
This result is a good example of (western) curoccntric bias since it leaves 
out one mood-indicating device which is very prominent in the languages of 
the world, namely particles. In Ultan's sample of seventy-nine languages, 
interrogative particles are the second most widespread device for marking 
polarity interrogatives (Ultan 1978: 226), and in European languages, although 
less prominent, they are not missing either, witness Welsh (interrogative 
particle a), Finnish (enclitic interrogative particle -kojko), Russian, where in 
some varieties of the written language // has the function of the standard 
polarity interrogative marker, Polish c^y, Turkish mi, and French, which is 
developing a (still transparent) sentence initial polarity interrogative particle 
est-ce Cjiie. 
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Outside of Europe modal sentence particles are quite frequent, although a 
closer look at Ultan's findings shows that he also subsumes verbal affixes 
under this heading, which of course are not easy to tell from clitic particles 
but should perhaps be better grouped under verbal mood. For example, his 
data about Konkow suggest that this language really has an interrogative 
verbal mood. 
Having outlined the inventory of sentence mood markers it is interesting 
to recall what other functions are expressed by the same kind of devices. 
Intonation, in its broadest sense, is also used for marking emphasis and 
junction (e. g. in the enumeration contours), interrogative words are often 
identical with indefinites and relatives (see below), modal verbs and verbal 
mood mostlv mark primarily predicate mood and sometimes evidentiality, 
and only in a secondary way do they codetermine sentence mood; constituent 
order can also indicate subordination, and sentence particles also mark ne­
gation, complementation, attitudes, and evidentiality. 
Almost all these additional functions of the same devices are somehow 
related to the sentence mood indicating function, which demonstrates once 
more the soundness of the maxim: Where there is relatedness of form, look 
for relatedness in function. 
3.2. The assertive mode and the declarative moods 
The declarative sentence mood as a structural coding means of the assertive 
modality is taken by many semanticists, especially those who are formally 
oriented, to be the default, basic, notionally unmarked, and central mood par 
excellence, (on Barwise, for example, writes: "Possible world semantics and 
situation semantics share the view that understanding the assertive use of 
declarative sentences is basic to understanding their meaning" (Barwise 
1987: 1). If this is correct, one would expect the languages of the world to 
treat their declarative sentences formally as the unmarked case, too. And, 
according to Sadock and Zwicky, most natural languages (at least most 
languages in their sample) do exactly this. In these unmarked-declarative 
languages, sentence types other than the declarative typically "have forms 
based on the declarative construction, in the sense that the other types involve 
the declarative construction plus some particle" or something else (Sadock — 
Zwicky 1985: 165). If one looks a little closer, however, the added particle is 
the only clear case, the other examples (change of word order and different 
inflection) could also be interpreted the other way around, unless one word 
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order or one inflection is established as basic by independent evidence. We 
will come back to this problem shortly. 
There is a far bigger problem for assuming the declarative as the universally 
unmarked sentence mood, namely the fact, also noted by Sadock and Zwicky, 
that there is a fair number of languages where declarative constructions are 
not the basis on which the other sentence types are formed. What such a 
marked-declarative language looks like depends on the means it uses for the 
coding of sentential modality. If it uses e. g. mainly sentence particles or 
affixes for this purpose, then it will use one sentence particle or affix, say, 
for interrogatives, and just another one for declaratives (instead of no particle 
at all, as the unmarked-declarative languages do). 
One example of such a language is Welsh (Bowen — Jones 1960), where 
the most common colloquial verbal constructions are with periphrastic verbs, 
and declarative sentences with periphrastic verbs have a sentence-initial affir­
mative particle y(r)jr which is absent in embedded clauses and which is 
parallel to the negative particle m(d) and to the interrogative particle a. (Note 
that there is no common declarative particle, and that therefore it would 
seem plausible to talk of two declarative moods: a positive or affirmative, 
and a negative one.) Sentences with non-periphrastic verbs however may lack 
the affirmative particle and therefore in Welsh declarative sentences are only 
partially marked. 6 
Hidatsa, a Northern Plains Siouan language, is another case in question, 
but here we have five obligatory and mutually exclusive sentence particles 
that present a proposition either a) as definite knowledge, emphatically 
described feeling, or promise ("Emphatic"), or b) as general knowledge 
("Quotative"), or c) as learned from hearsay ("Report"), or d) as believed, 
desired or felt by the speaker ("Period"), or finally e) as something the speaker 
does not know, but thinks the listener doesn't either ("Indefinite") (Matthews 
1965: 99 ff). Therefore one could talk here of five declarative moods instead 
of one, but just as the Welsh system has unmarked declaratives with non-
periphrastic verbs, the Hidatsa system has an unmarked declarative "under 
certain specific conditions" (Matthews 1965: 98). 
Third, Korean has a marked declarative, marked by a special obligatory 
declarative affix from a set of mutually exclusive affixes, in four of its seven 
speech styles. The authoritative style, however, has the same ending for 
declaratives and interrogatives, and the intimate and the polite style have the 
same ending for all four major modes: Assertion, question, directive, and 
proposal (Martin 1954: 21 f.). So it seems that systems with marked declara­
tives tend to be partial. 
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But there is at least one language that is claimed to have marked declaratives 
throughout, and that is German. German is among the languages in which 
constituent order plavs a prime role in the coding of sentential modality, and 
since constituent order, unlike particles or endings, cannot be present in the 
non-declarative moods and absent in the declarative, if one wants to maintain 
that the declarative mood is formally marked, one has to establish that the 
corresponding constituent order is marked or not basic. But that is exactly 
what most syntacticians nowadays accept as a correct assumption, namely 
that the unmarked or most basic constituent order in German clauses is the 
verb-final one, which is obligatory in all unmarked subordinate clauses and 
marked in non-subordinate clauses. 
I do not need to repeat all the arguments that have been adduced to 
support this view; let me just mention two of them. The first is the observation 
that particle verbs have their most natural form, the one where the particle 
is not separated from the verb, only in verb-final clauses, whereas verb-
second (and even more so, verb-first) clauses separate the particle from the 
verb: 
(2) . . . daß ich morgen heimfahre. 
. . . that I tomorrow home-go. 
(3) Ich fahre morgen heim. 
I go tomorrow home. 
(4) Fahre ich morgen heim? 
Go I tomorrow home? 
The second argument is derivable if one accepts the idea that markedness is 
positively correlated with restrictiveness. Then verb-second constructions are 
more marked than verb-last constructions, since the former admit only finite 
verb forms, and comprise only clauses, whereas the latter can have both finite 
and infinite forms, comprise both clauses and verb phrases, and are hence 
less restricted. 
In the rather limited class of independent infinitive constructions in German 
there is the type of the clause-like pseudo-coordination as exemplified in (5), 
that evokes the idea of pure possibility of predication by joining a referring 
expression with a predicating one without asserting that the predicate holds 
of the referent (on the contrary what is implicated is that it would be absurd 
to even entertain such a possibility). 
(5) Ich und morgen heimfahren! 
I and tomorrow home-go! 
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Thinking about the origin of this construction in the mere juxtaposition of 
a referring and a predicating unit without any mark of attitude towards the 
emerging Gedanke (in Frege's sense) makes one think about the option of 
introducing a new modality which would be even more basic than the assertive 
one, namely wrhat could be called the presentative mode. 
The function of the presentative would be simply to represent a proposition 
without any specification of the role it is to play in the discourse, especially 
without any commitment to its truth, falsity, pleasantness, or whatever, except 
that it is presented and therefore accessible as a possible topic for the ongoing 
discourse. 
One way of going on would be to present another proposition as necessarily 
cooccurring with the first one, turning the whole sequence into a conditional 
construction. And this is exactly what I consider to be the correct part of 
Haiman's thesis of the semantic equivalence of protasis and topic (Haiman 
1978): all protasis propositions are topical propositions, since apodoses are 
per definitionew about a virtual domain where the protasis proposition is true." 
The wrong part of Haiman's thesis is the other direction of the biconditional: 
not all topical propositions are protases. One can perfectly well present a 
proposition just in order to say that one does not want to even tentatively 
assume it as true or false (which would be the prerequisite for an if- or // 
^/-protasis), i . e. topicalize it in order to delete it from the list of topics. 
Palmer also thinks about what 1 call the presentative mode, but he suggests 
"that the declarative . . . may, perhaps, be . . . the neutral expression of a 
proposition with no direct indication of its epistemic status" (Palmer 1986: 
28 f.). In order to evaluate this proposal it seems important to keep sentential 
modality apart from sentence mood. The mode of asserting p is of course 
distinct from the mode of neutrally presenting p, and the notion of declarative 
mood is traditionally linked with the assertive mode. What Palmer's proposal 
amounts to is reinterpreting the formal markers that are usually interpreted 
as declarative mood markers as presentative markers, at least for languages 
like English, which uses the same clause structure in independent clauses and 
after that, whether, if, etc. So if one sticks to the traditional meaning of 
"declarative" one has to say that Palmer claims that languages like English 
have no declarative, and use the presentative instead plus some pragmatic 
principle like "the presentation of a proposition in its baldest form is usually 
to be regarded as a statement" (Palmer 1986: 87). I tend to disagree, following 
Austin (1961), who says that in Elnglish assertion is marked by the absence 
of an embedding context, and assuming that such an absence is also a 
structural marker. 
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The situation is much clearer in German, where verb-second clauses do 
definitely not express a presentativi, but a declarative mood. The existence 
of verb-second complement clauses does not constitute counterevidence, since 
their use is obviously closely related to asserting (compare Ich glaube, es wird 
regimi with *Ich glaube nicht, es wird regnen or *Ich bezweifle, es wird regnen). I 
propose to think of German verb-final constructions like es regnen ivird as 
expressing the neutral, presentativi mood, although this modality is neces­
sarily superseded by more specific modes, since such constructions are never 
independent. The nature of the presentativi mode as something very basic 
and at the same time rarely occurring on its own makes this quite understand­
able. 
Maybe the Hidatsa indefinite comes closest to being an independent pre­
sentami mood. Deliberative constructions like German Ob es wohl regnen 
wird? are obviously derived from interrogatives and should be located some­
where between the presentativi and the interrogative. 
Finally, the assumption of a (mostly hidden) presentative mode gives a 
plausible picture of the "curious situation in Huichol (an Uto-Aztccan lan­
guage of Mexico; cf. Grimes 1964: 27) where the form used as a question is 
often the unmarked form, though Huichol also has a marker for the 'assertive' 
mood" (Palmer 1986: 33). Again 1 disagree with Palmer, since both options 
he offers — that in Huichol the interrogative is the unmarked form, and 
alternatively that this unmarked construction is some kind of weak declarative 
"merely presenting propositions" (Palmer 1986: 33) and the one with the 
assertive marker a strong declarative — seem to me less plausible than the 
interpretation of this construction not as a declarative at all, even a weak 
one, but as a straightforward presentative, which naturally under certain 
circumstances lends itself to interrogative use. 9 One would expect to find 
protasis uses of it as well. 
3.3. The erotetic mode and the interrogative moods 
When Searle and Vanderveken treat questions as a subtype of directives 
among many others, they are supported in this view by the way English 
verbally names this kind of linguistic activity, namely frequently with the 
verb to ask, which is a verb of requesting that is not restricted to questions. 
But as we emphasized above, there is an important difference between naming 
and expressing a notion, and if we look at the means that are used in English 
and in other languages for the expression of the erotetic mode, i . e. the 
interrogative mood markers, and at the means that are used for the expression 
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of the directive mode, i.e. the imperative mood markers, it is by no means 
obvious that they indicate that one is a special case of the other, nor even 
that they are related at all. Let us look at the different types in turn, first at 
the interrogatives. 
Leaving aside special constructions like interrogative tags or rhetorical 
interrogatives, interrogatives seem to fall universally into three main cate­
gories for which several traditions of labeling coexist. 1 will use the terms 
"constituent interrogative" for the category that marks one or more constit­
uents of a sentence as something to be specified in an appropriate answer, 
"alternative interrogative" for the category that presents two or more different 
propositions with the understanding that exactly one of them can be specified 
as true, and "polarity interrogative" for the category that presents a propo­
sition as something to be confirmed or denied. 
Constituent interrogatives, whether they have additional marking (like 
changes in constituent order, intonation, or interrogative sentence particles) 
or not, seem to be definable as sentences with interrogative words that mark 
the relevant constituent or constituents as the focus or foci of both the 
question and any appropriate answer. Ultan (1978: 228) claims that "inter­
rogative words are characteristic of all languages". This has to be taken cum 
grano salis, however, since interrogative words are often formally identical 
with indefinite and relative proforms, as Ultan himself is well aware (1978: 
230), and as, e.g., Christian Lehmann confirms. He gives English, Latin, 
Hittite, Hebrew, Elamite, Nahuatl, and Yucatec as examples of languages 
with identical interrogative and relative proforms (Lehmann 1985: 325). 1 0 
German allows nice illustrations of the three functions of some /^-forms 
like wer and was: 
(6) Da kommt wer. 
There comes somebody. 
(Indefinite) 
(7) Wer kommt dal 
Who comes there? 
(Interrogative) 
(8) Wer da kommt, j ist der Briefträger, j 
Who there comes [is the postman.] 
(Relative) 
O f course not all interrogative words serve this triple function 1 1 in German, 
but presumably there are languages where all interrogative words arc formally 
identical with indefinites. Korean seems to be one of these, turning an 
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indefinite into an interrogative either by stressing or by fronting i t , 1 2 and 
Sadock and Zwickv even say that many languages do not formally distinguish 
between interrogatives and indefinites. Therefore the universal should be 
restated as "all languages have words that serve as interrogative words". This 
would be true in some sense even if Whor f s claim can be confirmed that in 
Hopi one has to say "Someone came" or " D i d someone come?" in order to 
express "Who came?" (Sadock-Zwicky 1985: 184). 
There are interesting differences with respect to what constituents can be 
asked for and the way this is reflected in the choice of the interrogative word. 
It would be theoretically possible, as Sadock and Zwicky note, for a language 
to get by with a single interrogative word, one that could be glossed 'what', 
and to do all the differentiation with periphrasis, but the smallest system they 
are aware of is the three-membered Yokuts system with its three stems glossed 
'who 1 , 'who, what', and 'where' (Sadock-Zwicky 1985: 184 f.). The extremely 
simple system conceived of by Sadock and Zwicky seems to exist in Tamasheq, 
which according to Hanoteau (1896) uses a single interrogative word for all 
kinds of constituent questions. 
There appears to be a differentiation hierarchy in interrogative word 
inventories with related implicational universale corresponding to the follow­
ing distribution: most languages have interrogative pro-nouns, many have 
interrogative pro-adverbs, fewer have interrogative pro-adjectives (Polish 
jtiki, Yiddish poser), few have interrogative pro-numerals (Latin quoi, quotus), 
and only a small number have interrogative pro-verbs (Sadock and Zwicky 
list Southern Paiutc, Ultan cites Western Desert and Mandarin, Sapir [1921: 
126] mentions Yana, and Johannes Bechert [personal communication] has 
pointed out to me that Avar should be added to this list). One could imagine 
the existence of interrogative pro-adpositions, but according to Katz and 
Postal (1964: 152, note 29) they cannot exist, whereas Weinrcich (1963: 122) 
thinks this is an open question. 
Exhaustive and precise data about alternative questions are not readily 
available, but a look across the European fence indicates that this category 
possibly has to be split into at least two subcategories, according to the 
intrinsic relation between the member propositions: polar opposition with 
negation as a special case, and non-polar opposition. Not all languages seem 
to treat these subcases alike, although probably most of them do. P^nglish, 
for example, does: 
(9) Are you coming or aren't you? 
( 10) Is this good or bad? 
Π 1) Is this green or blue? 
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According to Saha (1984: 137), (9) and (10) can be expressed in Bengali with 
the negative conjunction na where Knglish has or, a conjunction that requires 
the conjuncts to be semantically polar opposites. If this is correct, (11) cannot 
be expressed in the same way. Liven if this turns out to be wrong for Bengali, 
it is by no means evident that there is no language that does make such a 
distinction. 
Coming to the polarity interrogatives, 1 think it would be interesting to 
trace back all the etymologies of the interrogative particles. It is probably 
not too riskv to conjecture that most of them go back to or are grammati-
calizations of older items meaning negation (this is a possible origin of the 
Chinese main clause interrogative particle ma), doubt, hesitation, conditions 
(these are possible origins of the German subordinate clause interrogative 
marker ob), and the like. 
Even more frequent than interrogative particles is interrogative intonation 
and here the terminal rise contour is the most frequent, contrasting thus 
polarity interrogatives with parallel declaratives which mostly have a terminal 
fall. This is in concord with the iconic meaning of these contours: down is 
closing, up is opening. A well-formed discourse normally doesn't close with 
a question. Note that even one of the famous exceptions, Chitimacha (an 
extinct Penutian Gul f language) with its falling interrogative intonation 
preserves the contrast by just inverting it: in Chitimacha, declaratives have a 
rising terminal contour (Ultan 1978: 220). 
Finally, special constituent order, probably the most prominent device for 
marking polarity interrogatives when seen from a European vantage point, 
appears to be rather uncommon elsewhere in the world. In Ultan's sample 
of seventy-nine languages Khalkha (Mongolian) was the only non-European 
language to use this device. What happens almost invariably in polarity 
interrogative constituent order changes is that the verb or auxiliary is fronted 
from a verb-second position in declaratives. (A possible exception to this 
would be Hungarian, since there it is not obvious whether the unmarked 
order for declaratives is S V O or SOV.) If one assumes that in these languages 
the non-initial position contributes to the coding of the assertive force in 
non-embedded declaratives, it is plausible to assume that removing the verb 
from this position and fronting it is associated with stripping it of its assertive 
force. 
Although this is still rather speculative, if one compares the basic meanings 
of these three kinds of polarity interrogative markers, there is some evidence 
for the assumption that the common functional denominator of these devices 
is to suspend the assertive force of the sentence that without these devices 
would be present. 
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If this assumption is correct, then polarity interrogatives would have a 
functional common denominator with protasis clauses and one would expect 
this connection to he reflected in at least some formal correspondences. And 
these are not difficult to find. Traugott (1985: 291) lists two protasis markers 
as derived from interrogatives: Russian e sii (from 'to be' and the interrogative 
particle // mentioned above) and Hua -ve, but one could add German verb-
initial protasis clauses like (13) below, which is exactly like its interrogative 
counterpart (12), and one should also mention Biblical Hebrew which uses 
the opposite strategy, deriving the polaritv interrogative particle hd^im from 
an interrogative indicator ha and the protasis marker ^im (Sadock — Zwicky 
1985: 183). 
(12) Hast du ira sì 
Have vou something? 
(13) Π as l du iras, dann bist du was. j 
Have you something, [then are you something.] 
Additional evidence for the interrogative —protasis relationship comes from 
the fact that in a variety of languages some modified constituent interrogatives 
can plav the role of a special kind of protasis, which 1 have come to call 
"unconditional", since its effect is one of removing restrictions from, rather 
than imposing restrictions on, the validity of the apodosis. 1 ' 
To sum up, the examination of the ways natural languages code the different 
forms of the erotetic modality as interrogative sentence moods has collected 
some evidence in favour of the assumption that interrogative sentences are 
about their propositional content in a way that contrasts with parallel de­
clarative sentences in that they indicate a) the suspension of assertion (this is 
what thev have in common with protases), and b) the kind of information 
that is missing in order to make up a true assertion: polarity, choice from a 
set of propositions, and correct instantiation for what is left deliberately 
indeterminate in the proposition. 
3.4. The directive mode and the imperative moods 
Let us look now at the ways the directive mode is structurally coded in 
European and other languages, and at the relations these ways may bear to 
the coding means used for the interrogative. 
The first and probably most salient difference between the erotetic and the 
directive modality is that the latter is much more restricted with respect to 
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its propositional content than the former, which shares with the assertive 
mode the property of admitting any (absolute or parametric) proposition, 
-> whereas directives always have some controllable future course of events as 
their critical property and either the addressee (or one of them, if there is a 
plurality of addressees) as agent (which is coded mostly as subject), or a 
group including speaker and addressee (this is the so-called ejxhortatiye), or 
a third person. This semantic markedness is very often iconically coded by 
formally marked structures, namely structures with subject ellipsis even in 
languages that normally require an overt subject in active constructions. For 
example in German, (14) is a marked declarative, whereas (15) is an unmarked 
imperative. 
(14) Bist ein lieber Kerl. 
Are a nice guy. 
(15) Sei ein lieber Kerl! 
Be a nice guy! 
There are exceptions, however, to the obligatory subject ellipsis in German 
imperative sentences. First, remember that in German the imperative sentence 
mood has the verb in sentence-initial position, and its mood is the imperative, 
if the addressee is proximal and singular, otherwise it is the subjunctive mood. 
What do I mean by proximal? German has two paradigms of notional 1 y 
second-person or addressee pronouns, namely the unmarked, "familiar" or 
proximal (in a sociological, not a local sense) paradigm du, deiner, dir, dich, 
ihr, euer, euch, and the marked, "polite" or distal paradigm Sie, ihrer, Ihnen. 
The second paradigm is formally, with respect to agreement, third person 
plural and therefore notionally transnumeral. The distal way of addressing 
does not allow for subject ellipsis at all: 
(16) Seien Sie ein lieber Kerl! 
Be you -D lSTAL a nice guy! 
(17) *Seien ein lieber Kerl! 
Be a nice guy! 
The obligatory subject ellipsis with the proximal way of addressing has two 
kinds of exceptions, namely a) when a particular addressee is contrasted with 
some other possible addressee as in (18), b) when the addressee, though 
notionally of course second person, is formally third person, which happens 
in German not only with the distal form of address, but also when an 
indefinite member of a plurality of intended hearers is the addressee, as in 
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(19), and c) when all members of a plurality of intended hearers are addressees, 
as in (20): 
(18) Bring du mir eine Kreide und du einen Lappen! 
(jet you me a chalk and you a rag! 
(19) Hilf mir doch bitte einer die 'Tafel abwischen! 
Help mc yet please someone the blackboard wipe-off! 
(20) Iß keiner mehr als ihm \usteht! 
Fiat nobody more than him is-due! 
The situation w7ith the imperative sentence mood is less complicated in English 
and other languages, but it seems safe to assume that the heavily restricted 
and therefore semantically marked character of directives is formally marked 
in most languages of the world, be it by a defective paradigm in verbal 
inflexion, by a special sentence particle (Korean) or a special morpheme 
(Lahu). 
1 should not forget to mention a phenomenon that could be called the 
imperative marking paradox. It arises from the seeming discrepancy between 
the functionally marked character of the imperative, and the formal marking 
of the verb, which is often zero. Over half of the languages in Sadock and 
Zwicky's sample (with the rather modest size of thirty-three) "employ an 
entirely affixless verbal base to indicate requests" (Sadock — Zwicky 1985: 
172). 1 clo not think that the paradox is a real one, if one conceives markedness 
as deviation from a (formal or notional) standard, since it seems plausible to 
assume also negative formal marking (subject ellipsis in a language with 
otherwise obligatory surface subjects would be another instance of this 
phenomenon). 
Coming back to our search for structural evidence for the Searle — Vandcr-
veken claim that questions arc but a special case of directives it is probably 
correct to say that in the ways typologically diverse languages indicate their 
sentence moods there is no indication that they treat interrogatives as a special 
kind of imperative nor that the interrogative moods are related at all to the 
imperatives except through the declaratives. Why is this? 
1 think there is a mistake involved in Searle and Vanderveken's subsuming 
the erotetic mode under the directive: surely, when considered in an absolute 
manner, to ask somebody a question is a special case of requesting something 
from that person, but in connection with sentential modality the perspective 
is somewhat different, it is not absolute, but relative to a given propositional 
content. And it has to be relative to a given propositional content p that we 
ask questions like: What is the role of p in the discourse? In what way does 
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p relate to the discourse situation? And looked at from this perspective, it is 
of course not the case that the way the content of an interrogative sentence 
relates to the discourse situation is a special case of the way the content of 
an imperative sentence relates to the discourse situation. 
For the purposes of a linguistically interesting classification of illocutions, 
one that could be easily correlated with a classification of sentential modalities 
in general and with sentence moods in the different languages in particular, 
Searle and Vanderveken simply asked the wrong question. Instead of asking 
"Are questions special directives?", the answer to which is affirmative, but 
uninteresting, they should have asked "Are questions with a certain content 
special directives with the same content?",which has to be answered in the 
negative. That is why they are so differently marked. The whole special-case 
issue comes up only if one includes some activity of the addressee in the 
propositional content of the question, which of course is possible (e. g. in 
Tell me if it is raining!), but which simply is not the standard way natural 
languages code questions. 
So what we come up with is not a special case of the addressee-oriented 
illocution type directive with its typical world-to-word direction of fit, but 
another type which, like the assertion, has the word-to-world direction of fit, 
but one where it is up to the addressee to assume responsibility for the fitting 
of the words to the world. 
Instead of analysing questions as a special case of directives, we have 
followed the lead of structural means in natural languages for coding ques­
tions, and have come up with an analysis of questions not as a subcase of 
directives, but as a sister case of assertives, with the common denominator 
being the presentation of a proposition under the perspective of raising the 
question of its being true or false, and with the specific difference that the 
speaker does not commit himself to its truth (or the truth of its dual, or of 
some of its instantiations, if it is a parametric one) but rather asks the 
addressee, if there is any, to do so. So what is correct in Searle and Vander-
veken's intuition is preserved, but put in its adequate, less central place. 
4. The most prominent sentence moods and the most 
basic illocution types 
After my critique of Searle and Vanderveken's treatment of questions and 
interrogatives and their relation to directives and imperatives it can be 
expected that I also have some qualms about the role they assign to decla-
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Assertion of ρ 
[Declarative] 
Hxclamation about correct 
poi a ri tv of ρ 
[Polarity exclamatory] 
Kxclamation about correct 
instantiation for χ in p[x] 
(Scalar exclamatory] 
Neutral presentation 





Question about correct 
polarity of ρ 
[Polarity interrogative] 
Question about correct 
instantiation for χ in ρ [x| 
[Constituent interrogative] 
Question about the true 
member of {p, q, ...} 
[Alternative interrogative] 
Presentation of ρ 
as goal [Directive! 
Presentation of ρ 
as object of wish 
[Optative] 
Figure 1. Relatedness between the major sentence modalities 
rations and commissives, but 1 will defer this discussion to another occasion. 
1 will conclude instead by outlining a picture of how 1 think the major 
sentence modalities are related, a picture that I claim is better compatible 
with what is known about how natural languages of diverse types code 
sentential modality than the picture drawn by Searle and Vanderveken. 
It supposes the presentative mode to be the weakest, most basic one, 
because it is at the core of every illocutionary act with a propositional content. 
It is pictured in Figure 1 at the root of the tree, which is to represent the 
entailment relation (going upward) between the illocutions standardly ex­
pressed by sentences in the corresponding mood (indicated in brackets), since 
the presentative is entailed bv every illocution with a propositional content. 
The picture then shows the assertive, the assumptive (hypothetical), and 
the goal-presenting mode as three specifications of the neutral mode. Next 
follow the different kinds of questions as further specifications of the as­
sumptive mode, pictured in a block, since no entailment relation holds 
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between them. The first two kinds of questions are paralleled by the two 
kinds of exclamation (about the polarity of a proposition and about the scalar 
value of one of its constituents) as specifications of the assertive mode that 
are influenced by the corresponding kinds of questions (this influence is 
indicated by the broken lines). Finally, the picture classifies (this is very 
tentative, but at least English and German show some evidence in favour of 
such an assumption) 1 4 the optative mood as a specification of the hypothetical 
one, claiming that every expression of a wish entails a hypothetical presen­
tation of its content. 
1 consider it supporting evidence for this picture that all these content 
relations between the modes and, where they exist, the corresponding moods 
are reflected by formal relations between the markers of these moods at least 
in some of the languages that have these moods. If this paper stimulates the 
search for further evidence or counterevidence, it has achieved at least one 
of its aims. 
Notes 
1. The specification "maximal proposition" assures uniqueness for most cases, like / think il is 
raining, which under normal circumstances is about two propositions, namely that it is 
raining and that the speaker thinks so, or It's sunny bui it's cold outside, which is about three 
propositions, the maximal being the conjunction of the two minor ones; there are however 
cases like This picture is beautiful but can we afford it? that have multiple propositional content 
and therefore multiple modality. I will neglect these complications in what follows wherever 
possible, i.e. except in connection with alternative questions. 
2. For a survey of different theories of sentence mood see Grewendorf— Zaefferer (in press). 
3. Cf. I .ee—Maxwell (1970). Non-structural ways of coding the promissive modality include 
continuations like . . . and that's a promise. 
4. 1 owe this distinction to Simon Dik (1987). 
5. This distinction has been emphasized in Zaefferer (1983), where 1 argue for taking the wavs 
forces are expressed (indicated) rather than the ways they are named (labeled) as a starting 
point for linguistic analysis (the latter is the Austin — Searle — Vanderveken strategy). I still 
think that this argument is a sound one, in fact the present paper is meant to adduce 
additional evidence in its favour. 
6. The view that colloquial Welsh should be regarded nevertheless as being a marked-declarative 
language to a quite high degree is confirmed by an anonymous referee, who notes that "in 
colloquial Welsh even nonperiphrastic verbs take affirmative particles; moreover, the inter­
rogative particle is usually dropped, resulting in declaratives that are more marked than 
interrogatives." This property of colloquial W;elsh seems to be less conspicuous however in 
its spoken form, where the affirmative particle is often not pronounced before consonants, 
on the one hand, and where interrogative sentences without the corresponding particle can 
still be recognized because they show lenition ("soft mutation") of the verbal form (Johannes 
Bechert, p. c ) . 
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7. This is what Wittgenstein (1967: 23) calls Sat^radikud (sentence radical). 
8. It should be mentioned that this normal situation can be inverted by special contexts like 
the ones createti bv questions, cf. When is a number prime? — Λ number is prime if ... 
9. Probably this is what Palmer with his second alternative had in mind. 
10. Von Bremen (1987) lists some more languages but speaks of "the rarity of the phenomenon 
of relative Q-words" (1987: 2). 
11. For a synopsis and preliminary analysis of the different functions of w-constructions in 
German see Zacfferer (1990). 
12. Kisun Hong, Stanford, personal communication. 
13. Cf. Xaefferer 1990 a. 
14. English: If only somebody had told usi In German two prominent means of protasis formation, 
the conjunction wenn and the vcrb-Ftrst constituent order, can be further specified to yield 
optative constructions, if the verb is in the subjunctive, (i) and (ii) are examples, the a-
variant of a protasis, the b-variant of the corresponding optative: 
(i) a. Wenn es geregnet hätte, [wäre der Rasen naß.] 
If it rained had, [would-be the lawn wet.] 
b. Wenn es nur ge regne! hätte! 
If it only rained had! 
(ii) a. Ilatte es geregnet, [so wäre der Rasen naß.j 
Had it rained, [then would- be the lawn wet.] 
b. Hätte es nur geregnet! 
Had it only rained! 
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